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CONGRESS SHOULD RESPOND: A PAYOUT 
FOR SOME DAFS AND NEW RULES FOR 
NONCASH CONTRIBUTIONS 
ROGER COLINVAUX* 
Abstract: Donor advised funds attract a significant share of charitable giving 
and warrant Congress’s attention. The national sponsoring organization is dis-
tinct from other DAF sponsors. The national sponsoring organization’s ex-
empt purpose is to spend money for the benefit of other 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, and is best characterized as a fundraising organization. Given the na-
tional sponsoring organization’s exempt purpose, it is already subject to a 
facts and circumstances based payout. Because national sponsoring organiza-
tions fundamentally are vehicles for spending not saving, Congress should 
apply legislatively the commensurate in scope test and require that national 
sponsoring organizations spend contributed funds over a specified time peri-
od. The goal is to provide a spending period long enough so as not to alienate 
new donors, but short enough so as not to extend unduly the delay to charity 
that results when DAFs are used as public charity substitutes. Congress also 
should note that DAFs increasingly are used for noncash charitable contribu-
tions. The positive effect will be to make property conversions more efficient. 
The negative effect will be to accentuate the broken system for property con-
tributions at great expense. DAFs present an opportunity for Congress to re-
duce the cost of the subsidy for property contributions and move to a net ben-
efit to charity approach to the deduction. 
INTRODUCTION 
The donor advised fund (or DAF) is the worst development in the his-
tory of philanthropy. The donor advised fund is the best development in the 
history of philanthropy. Which is it? The answer of course is neither – both 
statements exaggerate. But the sentiment that the donor advised fund is a 
disrupting presence with unknown ramifications to the 501(c)(3) sector is 
accurate. 
Without a doubt, the donor advised fund (DAF) is a burgeoning force 
in philanthropy in the 21st century. Two of the five top recipients for chari-
table gifts in the United States are sponsoring organizations of donor ad-
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vised funds – the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund and the Schwab Charitable 
Fund.1 There are over 1,000 charities that sponsor more than 217,000 DAF 
accounts, holding almost $54 billion.2 DAFs spent about $9.66 billion in 
2013 on 501(c)(3) purposes,3 a significant share of spending in the nonprof-
it sector. The money is pouring in, and will likely continue. In 2013, $17.28 
billion was contributed to DAFs, as compared to $13.99 billion the year 
before and about $10 billion five years before that (2007).4 DAFs are popu-
lar with donors because they are efficient, convenient, and rewarding. 
Yet with success comes scrutiny. The concern most often voiced is 
straightforward: donors are allowed a charitable deduction for federal in-
come tax purposes upon contribution to a DAF sponsoring organization but 
there is no requirement that the DAF (or the sponsoring organization) ever 
spend the money. This is unusual if DAFs are compared to private founda-
tions, which like DAFs make grants of contributed funds over time. Private 
foundations though are subject to a precise pay out rule; DAFs and sponsor-
ing organizations are not. One of the plainest policy questions then is 
whether DAFs should be subject to a payout requirement either at the DAF 
or sponsoring organization level. 
DAFs also are emerging as a leading source of charitable contributions 
of property. DAF sponsoring organizations are actively soliciting contribu-
tions of illiquid assets like privately traded stock, real estate, fine art, and 
collectibles, as well as publicly traded securities. The use of DAFs to con-
vert property to cash for the benefit of charities has appeal but also raises 
questions about whether DAFs will improve or worsen the already broken 
system of property contributions. 
More broadly, the success of the donor advised fund is disturbing 
longstanding norms for charitable giving and spending in the United States. 
In 2013, roughly 7.2 percent of all charitable giving by individuals was to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 The Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund ranks second; the Schwab Charitable Fund ranks fourth. 
Another, the Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program, is tenth. “The 2014 Philanthropy 400,” 
The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Oct. 14, 2014 (measuring the top 400 charities, measured by 
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 2 NATIONAL PHILANTHROPIC TRUST, 2014 DONOR-ADVISED FUND REPORT (2014) (hereinaf-
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 3 Id. at 1. 
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donor advised funds.5 As DAFs share of the charitable giving pie grows, 
questions arise. Are DAF contributions substitutes for gifts to other public 
charities, depriving active causes of much needed funds? Are DAFs instead 
substitutes for private foundations? Or are DAFs attracting funds that oth-
erwise would have been privately consumed? 
The DAF debate is in a confused state, in part because there is no 
common understanding of what DAFs represent. DAF sponsoring organiza-
tions are called public charities, but as grant-making entities, seem more 
like private foundations. One difficulty is that not all DAF sponsoring or-
ganizations are the same making it hard to generalize. The biggest and per-
haps best-known of DAF sponsors are national in scope and often affiliated 
with large investment firms (like Fidelity, Schwab, and Vanguard).  The 
main activity of national sponsoring organizations is to sponsor DAFs.  Na-
tional sponsoring organizations “largely focus on receiving contributions, 
converting non-cash donations into a more liquid form, facilitating grant-
making, and managing the investment of DAF assets, rather than the direct 
provision of charitable services.”6  National sponsoring organizations spon-
sor roughly 52 percent of all DAFs, make 43 percent of all grants, collect 53 
percent of all contributions, and hold 47 percent of DAF account asset val-
ue.7 Thus, national sponsoring organizations amount to about one-half of 
the DAF industry even though they are the fewest in number (about four 
percent). 
Other sponsors are community foundations, which have a more local 
focus. “Community foundations commonly raise funds and make grants to 
support numerous charitable initiatives in their communities, and they hold 
endowments for local charitable projects in a number of funds, often includ-
ing DAFs.”8  Still other sponsoring organizations are organized around a 
                                                                                                                           
 5 The National Philanthropic Trust describes DAF contributions as 5.2 percent of all gifts to 
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Giving USA. “Total charitable giving,” however, does not represent new gifts to the charitable 
sector.  Rather, “total charitable giving” measures all giving, including not only giving by individ-
uals, but also by foundations, corporations, and by bequest. To get a better sense of DAF contribu-
tions as a share of charitable gifts, what matters is not DAF contributions as a percentage of “total 
charitable giving,” as that number is typically used, but DAF contributions as a percentage of new 
giving, i.e., the percentage of all money flowing into the charitable sector for the first time that 
goes to a donor advised fund. Only this percentage will convey the significant of DAFs as a giving 
vehicle as compared to other choices donors have. A better formula is to divide total contributions 
($17.28 billion) by total individual giving ($240.60 billion), or 7.2 percent. This assumes that total 
contributions are by individuals. See generally NPT 2014 Report at 1; Giving USA Report for 
2013 at 8. 
 6 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS 
AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 49 (Dec. 2011) (hereinafter “Treasury Report”). 
 7 Percentages compiled from information in NPT 2014 Report at 7-9 for the year 2013. 
 8 TREASURY REPORT at 51. 
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single issue. “Some common Single-Issue Charities include universities, 
Jewish federations, other faith-based charities, and issue-specific charities, 
such as those in the environmental, social justice or international relief are-
nas.”9  A distinguishing feature of single-issue sponsoring organizations is 
that some are “primarily involved in the direct provision of charitable ser-
vices.”10  This means that in contrast to national sponsoring organizations, 
which mainly provide DAFs, and community foundation sponsors, which 
are primarily grant-making organizations, many single issue sponsors are 
active charities that use DAFs as a fundraising tool. 
This Article seeks to advance the understanding of the donor advised 
fund and to provide answers to two of the main policy questions: whether to 
impose a payout on DAFs and their sponsoring organizations and how to 
respond to the increased use of DAFs for noncash charitable contributions. 
In general, it is beyond the scope of this article to fine-tune the discussion 
of DAFs to account fully for each type of sponsoring organization.  Often, 
the generic term “DAF” or “DAF sponsoring organization” is used.  That 
said, Part I of the Article refers in the main to national sponsoring organiza-
tions, though some of the general discussion in Part I also pertains to DAFs 
sponsored by community foundations and single-issue sponsors.11  Part II of 
the Article is concerned with national sponsoring organizations exclusively 
and whether national sponsoring organizations should be subject to a pay-
out.  Part III of the Article (regarding noncash contributions) applies more 
broadly to all sponsoring organizations eligible to receive charitable contri-
butions. 
Part I of the Article sets the stage by discussing the different, some-
times overlapping ways DAFs are viewed – as quasi private foundations, 
public charity substitutes, or as catalysts for new charitable giving. Viewed 
as quasi-private foundations, the issue is whether DAFs should be subject to 
more aspects of the private foundation regime. Viewed as public charity 
substitutes, the concern is that DAFs are intermediaries and delay charity 
and should be subject to a payout rule. Viewed as the reason for new gifts, 
DAFs have promise but also require shaping to work best for the charitable 
sector. 
                                                                                                                           
 9 NPT 2014 Report at 2. 
 10 TREASURY REPORT at 49. 
 11 Although Parts I and II of the Article are focused on national sponsoring organizations, 
donor advised funds at community foundations and single-issue sponsors merit separate consid-
eration. One of the anomalies of current law is that donor advised funds are defined and regulated 
without regard to sponsor. DAFs, however, need not be uniform. Characteristics of sponsoring 
organizations may be such that different rules should apply. Notably, important definitional ques-
tions will need to be addressed when sponsoring organizations are distinguished. 
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Part II then considers the basis of the 501(c)(3) status for national 
sponsoring organizations. The exempt purpose of an NSO is to make grants 
to other 501(c)(3) organizations. This is a sufficient predicate for exempt 
status, but as a fundraising organization, the national sponsoring organiza-
tion also is required to pay out commensurate with its resources. National 
sponsoring organizations, like other fundraising organizations, also raise 
private benefit concerns that cast a shadow on national sponsoring organiza-
tion operations. Part II concludes that because national sponsoring organiza-
tions fulfill their mission by spending, it is appropriate for Congress to ap-
ply the commensurate in scope test with a bright line and impose a payout 
at the fund level. 
Part III of the Article then examines the use of sponsoring organiza-
tions (not just national sponsoring organizations) to process noncash assets. 
Property contributions have long been a source of concern, quite apart from 
donor advised funds. The issues vary but include a deduction for unrealized 
appreciation, overvaluation of contributed property, uncertain benefits to 
charity, equity concerns, and enforcement. The widespread use of DAFs for 
noncash contributions will accentuate the problems of current law. Part III 
concludes that if Congress intends to retain the subsidy for property contri-
butions, DAFs present an opportunity to improve and lower the cost of the 
subsidy both by reducing the amount of unrealized appreciation that may be 
deducted and by basing the amount of the deduction on the net benefit to 
charity.  Part III generally applies to any charitable contribution of property, 
not just contributions to sponsoring organizations. 
It is important at the outset to identify the federal interest in regulating 
DAFs. As an initial matter, there is a clear federal interest to protect against 
abuse of the charitable deduction. Because donors receive a charitable de-
duction for DAF contributions, the federal government has an interest in 
ensuring that the funds are not directed to private use. It should go without 
saying that charitable giving that mainly benefits the donor is charitable in 
name only and should not be allowed, whatever the giving vehicle.12 
Apart from anti-abuse measures, which potentially could be exten-
sive,13 the federal interest in DAFs is esoteric, but important. As measured 
by the huge sums pouring into donor advised funds, DAFs clearly matter to 
the 501(c)(3) sector as a whole and to how charitable services are delivered 
in the United States. The government has a stake, not simply as a matter of 
taxation, but as a matter of the public interest, to help ensure a reasonably 
efficient and equitable system of private charity. In other words, setting 
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aside abuse, the challenge is to adopt an affirmative public policy toward 
donor advised funds, taking into account the unique characteristics of DAFs 
and a sense of how DAFs should operate within the philanthropic system. 
PART I. UNTANGLING THE OVERLAPPING VIEWS OF DAFS 
A main question about donor advised funds is what DAF contributions, 
and DAFs, represent. Are DAFs taking from private foundations, other pub-
lic charities, or attracting funds that otherwise would have been privately 
consumed? Each alternative destination for DAF contributions suggests a 
different regulatory approach. Relatedly, DAFs represent different things to 
different observers – some view DAFs as private foundation equivalents, 
others as something else. This part of the article outlines three different, 
though not mutually exclusive, views of DAFs – as quasi-private founda-
tions, public charity substitutes, and as catalysts for new charitable giving. 
Each view provides insights about the role of DAFs in the philanthropic 
system, and suggests ways in which DAFs should be regulated. 
A. DAFs as Quasi Private Foundations 
Perhaps the most common way to conceptualize donor advised funds 
is by analogy to the private foundation.14 The comparison is made because 
the DAF and the private foundation have a similar core function. Both are 
grant-making vehicles, subject to the direction or advice of the donor. In the 
case of a private foundation, donors establish and control a separate entity, 
contribute funds, and then over time distribute the funds for the exempt 
purposes of the foundation. In the case of a DAF, donors make arrange-
ments with a (typically pre-existing) private charity, the sponsoring organi-
zation, to open and administer a separate and distinct account often in the 
donor’s name. The donor funds the account, and then gives advice over time 
about account distributions, consistent with the donor’s charitable prefer-
ences. 
A key difference between the private foundation and the DAF is the 
legal control over funds exercised by donors. With the private foundation, 
donors and related parties may and do exercise control of donated funds 
through control of the foundation. With DAFs, donors typically do not con-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See e.g., TREASURY REPORT at 29 (stating that “[t]he closest analogue among private foun-
dations . . . to DAFs are grant-making non-operating foundations”). The DAF is often coined as 
the “poor man’s private foundation.” Private foundations can be “non-operating” or “operating.” 
The private foundation referred to in this Article generally is non-operating, meaning a grant-
making organization. 
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trol the sponsoring organization, and therefore may at best only provide ad-
vice to the sponsoring organization about the distribution of fund assets.15 
Nevertheless, although legal control over funds is vested with the 
sponsoring organization, for the DAF to be attractive to donors there is a 
strong expectation that sponsoring organizations will follow donor advice.16 
If donor advice were not followed regularly and as a matter of course, do-
nors would quickly grow frustrated and end the relationship. Accordingly, 
the advice rendered by donors with respect to funds contributed by the do-
nor is often thought of as a legal fiction, masquerading as control.17 Donors 
remain in effective control of the assets and can make grants in a similar 
manner as with a private foundation. 
But as compared to a private foundation, the DAF is a less costly, at-
tractive alternative. The amount allowed as a deduction is larger for many 
types of noncash contributions to a DAF sponsoring organization than for 
contributions to private foundations. 18  Charitable contributions to DAF 
sponsoring organizations are subject to a higher cap (based on the donor’s 
adjusted gross income).19 Further, a private foundation is subject to a tax on 
investment income, a payout requirement, a comprehensive self-dealing 
regime, and limitations on spending20 – none of which apply to sponsoring 
                                                                                                                           
 15 When national sponsoring organizations first emerged, an early question was whether do-
nors provided “advice” (no legal control) or gave “direction” (legal control). See e.g., INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) 
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996, M. DONOR DIRECTED FUNDS. If a 
donor retains control, then the contribution is not viewed as a completed gift, and no charitable 
deduction is allowed. 
 16 TREASURY REPORT at 69 (noting that “[n]o respondent reported ongoing disagreements 
with donors over the appropriateness of potential grants, and all respondents said that, in general, 
donor advice was followed”). 
 17 See Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, AN 
ANALYSIS OF CHARITABLE GIVING AND DONOR ADVISED FUNDS 3 (July 11, 2012) (hereinafter 
“CRS Report”) (noting that “[e]vidence suggests . . . that donors to DAFs have effective control 
over grants, and to some extent investments, because sponsoring organizations typically follow the 
donor’s advice.”); TREASURY REPORT, at 69 (noting that one respondent thought that DAFs “ap-
pear to give DAF donors de facto control over investment and distribution decisions”). As an 
illustration of how donor-advised funds are viewed in the field, Giving USA defines a donor-
advised fund as: “An account by which donors may provide charitable gifts. This type of account 
is facilitated by community foundations or financial services companies. Donors typically contrib-
ute large amounts in the form of tax-deductible assets to these accounts in order to grow the assets, 
and donors usually choose to have significant control over the funds and direct which nonprofits 
will be recipients of the gifts.” Giving USA Report for 2014 at 263 (emphasis added). The defini-
tion is a good example of the fact that legal formalities aside, in practice donors expect to control 
fund distributions. 
 18 In general, for contributions of appreciated property, the donor may deduct the fair market 
value of the property if to a public charity, but may only deduct the cost basis if to a private foun-
dation. I.R.C. § 170(a), (e). Exceptions apply. See infra Part III for additional discussion. 
 19 I.R.C. § 170(b). 
 20 I.R.C. §§ 4940-4945. 
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organizations (or DAFs). In addition, donors do not have to administer 
DAFs and so are free of compliance burdens.21 
When donors choose a DAF over a private foundation, one regulatory 
model thus emerges. Viewed as a quasi-private foundation, the question is 
simply whether the DAF is essentially a loophole, i.e., a vehicle donors can 
use to avoid the private foundation regime. If so, then the issue is whether 
any or all of the private foundation rules, including the less favorable de-
duction rules and a payout, should apply to DAFs. 
To date, the view of DAFs as quasi-private foundations has guided the 
legislative process. In 2006, Congress determined that the public charity 
nature of DAF sponsoring organizations provided insufficient protection 
against abuse22 and applied some of the private foundation rules (or close 
analogues) to donor advised funds. 23  Thus, Congress penalized certain 
transactions even if at arm’s length,24 restricted the types of permissible dis-
tributions from DAFs,25 and directly applied the private foundation limits 
on the permissible holdings in any one business.26 Congress did not, how-
ever, require a payout,27 impose the harsher charitable deduction rules, or 
subject DAFs to a tax on investment income.28 
The more DAFs are understood as private foundations, the more DAFs 
resemble a loophole, and the stronger the logic for applying additional parts 
of the private foundation regime to DAFs.29 Thus, one continuing thread of 
the policy debate is whether Congress should continue on the current path 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Private foundations also file a different information return, the Form 990-PF than public 
charities. 
 22 The path for abuse is straightforward. A donor takes a deduction for a DAF contribution, 
and then advises out a grant that directly or indirectly benefits the donor. Unless a sponsoring 
organization is very active in supervising grants, this type of abuse would be fairly easy. This is 
the reason DAFs generally may not make grants to individuals, but are limited to public charities. 
 23 Congress implicitly copied the private foundation approach. For additional discussion, see 
Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FL. TAX REV. 1, 60-63 
(2011). Congress did not distinguish among sponsoring organizations but focused on the DAF qua 
DAF. 
 24 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2). 
 25 I.R.C. §§ 4966, 4967. 
 26 I.R.C. § 4943(e). 
 27 A payout was enacted in the Senate but did not survive final passage. The Tax Relief Act of 
2005, S. 2020, 109th Cong. § 331 (as passed by the Senate, Nov. 18, 2005). 
 28 For a description of all the rules imposed on DAFs, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 624-44 
(Comm. Print 2007). 
 29 This was the initial approach of the Treasury Department, which in 2000 proposed regulat-
ing sponsoring organizations and DAFs (at the account level) as private foundations. DEPART-
MENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 
2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, Clarify Public Charity Status of Donor Advised Funds 105 (Feb. 
2000). 
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and apply more of the private foundation rules to DAFs and DAF sponsor-
ing organizations. 
B. DAFs as Public Charity Substitutes 
Donor advised funds are also viewed as substitutes for other public 
charities. Under this view, DAFs offer the functionality of a private founda-
tion but are funded with money that otherwise would have gone to another 
public charity.30 For example, but for the existence of DAFs, a donor would 
have given to a human services organization, the donor’s alma mater, an art 
museum, or some other operating charity. When the donor instead contrib-
utes to a DAF, the DAF has altered the distribution of charitable funds. In a 
zero sum game,31 the success of DAFs comes at the expense of other public 
charities.32 
This then invites closer consideration of the true nature of the DAF 
and the national sponsoring organization. If DAFs perform just like other 
public charities, then the federal tax issues are nothing new. The shift in 
charitable giving would simply reflect a (healthy) competition. For exam-
ple, if a new art museum is so successful that it attracts charitable gifts 
away from other art museums, the public writ large still gets art (supported 
by the same donors), albeit in a different location and form. A slightly dif-
ferent case arises if the new art museum attracts contributions that normally 
would have gone to the soup kitchen. Now, the success of art comes at the 
cost of serving the needy. This may be of concern (the competition now is 
perhaps less healthy), but non-interference with the substantive preferences 
of donors is an endemic policy of the charitable deduction, which largely 
avoids making value judgments about exempt purposes.33 
                                                                                                                           
 30 In general, the tax law divides section 501(c)(3) organizations into two broad categories: 
private foundation and public charity. The default characterization is a private foundation. Organi-
zations avoid foundation status either based on their principle function (e.g., as a church, school, 
or hospital) or by reason of their public support. I.R.C. § 509. 
 31 For illustrative purposes here, a zero sum game is assumed. The assumption of a non zero 
sum game is discussed next. 
32 The substitution effect is plainest with respect to contributions to NSOs, and so is the focus of 
the discussion here. Substitution may occur at DAFs sponsored by single issue charities or com-
munity foundations, but to a lesser extent. For example, if a donor created a DAF at his alma ma-
ter, but for DAFs, this same gift might well have gone to the alma mater, so there is no substitu-
tion. The DAF in this context is merely an additional fundraising tool for the university. Contribu-
tions to DAFs at community foundations present other considerations. Community foundation 
DAFs may be substitutes for private foundations, other public charities, or, because community 
foundations offer a unique form of community support, the community foundation DAFs might be 
more like the university, with no substitution. 
 33 The charitable deduction is generally value-neutral, based on the purposes of the organiza-
tion. Value judgments are reflected in the purposes chosen – charitable, educational, scientific, 
religious, literary – but apart from that, the IRS mostly assesses means not ends. Whether the 
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 DAFs at national sponsoring organizations though are not like other 
public charities. National sponsoring organizations do not have an inde-
pendent substantive charitable purpose or goal. National sponsoring organi-
zations are not formed to relieve poverty, eliminate malaria, improve educa-
tion, foster community development, etc.34 Rather, national sponsoring or-
ganizations are essentially fundraising machines. The national sponsoring 
organization principally collects funds, retains financial advice, and per-
forms the administrative function of ensuring that the recipient suggested by 
the donor-advisor is on the IRS’s list of eligible public charities.35 Given the 
nature of the national sponsoring organization, the delay in distributions 
caused by DAFs is problematic.36 
Further, donors to national sponsoring organizations are encouraged, 
implicitly or not, to become savers rather than spenders. To see why, con-
sider a hypothetical (but likely typical) contribution by a donor to Fidelity 
Charitable.37 The donor already has funds invested with Fidelity on a pri-
vate, commercial basis. As the end of the year approaches, the donor re-
ceives charitable solicitations from a number of local charities but, as in 
prior years, has trouble deciding which ones to support and in what amount. 
Coincidentally, the donor then also receives a solicitation from Fidelity 
Charitable. The solicitation promises an immediate charitable deduction, 
and tells the donor that he or she can advise at any time in the future about 
the eventual 501(c)(3) recipient.  
 Given the donor’s indecision about which charities to support, the 
offer is perfect, and the donor establishes a DAF with Fidelity. The donor is 
                                                                                                                           
charitable deduction should remain value neutral is a different debate outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 34 As Fidelity puts it: “The mission of the organization is to further the American tradition of 
philanthropy by providing programs that make charitable giving simple and effective.” FIDELITY 
CHARITABLE, 2015 Giving Report: A Deeper Look at Fidelity Charitable Donors and the Many 
Ways They Give 26 (2015) (hereinafter “Fidelity 2015 Report”). 
 35 Noncharitable status would be the main basis for a sponsoring organization to reject a do-
nor’s advice. If a donor advises a grant to a bona fide public charity, and the sponsoring organiza-
tion is unaware of any benefits flowing to the donor because of the contribution, then sponsoring 
organizations would be hard pressed (even though legally entitled) to reject donor advice. 
 36 There is a technical argument that DAF contributions do not result in a delay to a charity in 
receiving benefits. The argument would be that because a sponsoring organization is a bona-fide 
public charity, there is no “delay” because the funds have been contributed to charity. An analogy 
also could be to funds contributed to any charity where the funds are not spent immediately, but 
accumulated by the charity for future use. In such (common) cases, there clearly is a delay or gap 
between the time of the deduction and the ultimate use of the funds for charitable beneficiaries, 
yet this delay does not seem to cause similar agitation as occurs with DAFs. As discussed in Part 
II, NSOs, though public charities, are distinct from other organizations in that spending funds is 
their main activity. 
37 The Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund is chosen by reference here because it is the largest sponsor-
ing organization of DAFs, organization in the United States. 
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very pleased. The donor has made a deductible charitable contribution, and 
because the donor has legally parted with the funds, feels the “warm glow” 
often associated with charitable giving. The arrangement also suits Fidelity 
because the funds remain under management by the for-profit side of Fi-
delity, thus continuing to earn management fees.38 
 In addition, the donor may even reconsider how to give in the future. 
Before establishing the donor advised fund, the donor typically made con-
tributions to a variety of public charities in small amounts each year. But 
now that the donor’s annual giving may accumulate in a DAF, the donor 
starts to think about giving differently – less as spending and more as sav-
ing. The donor considers: should I accumulate assets to make a really big 
gift later? Should I build up a sufficient sum so that I can advise distribu-
tions of just the income each year? Should I involve my children in grant-
making? This attitude likely is reinforced by the fact that many sponsoring 
organizations have relatively high contribution thresholds for initial gifts of 
several thousand dollars. This reinforces for the donor the idea that money 
set aside in a DAF is more of an investment for the future than a spending 
transaction. 
 Relatedly, the donor may become possessive of the DAF. The donor 
knows that the money formally is out of her legal control, but this is not 
transparent. The funds, prior to contribution, were held and managed by 
Fidelity in a mutual fund in her name. After the contribution, the funds are 
held and managed by Fidelity in a mutual fund in her name. The funds may 
even be in a similar mutual fund as before the contribution.39 She knows 
Fidelity is unlikely to distribute money from her DAF without her advice. 
She receives quarterly statements showing investment gains in her account.  
 Taken altogether, from the donor’s perspective, the money in the 
DAF still feels like it is “hers,” subject to her will. As additional reinforce-
ment, sponsoring organizations honor advisory privileges across genera-
tions,40 meaning that the ability to advise becomes a kind of asset that the 
                                                                                                                           
38 The loser from this transaction (at least in the short-term), however, is the public charity that 
would have received the money but for the DAF. The charity must wait to receive funds at a later 
date, if at all. The DAF here is little more than an intermediary, delaying the time at which the 
ultimate beneficiary will receive control of the funds. Arguably, another loser from the transaction 
is the federal government. If the donation is $10,000 and the donor is in the 35 percent tax bracket, 
then the government supports the transaction by foregoing $3,500 in revenue. But the payoff to 
the government does not occur until the donor advises that the money be distributed from the 
DAF. 
39 “At Fidelity Charitable, donors can recommend an investment strategy that aligns with their 
goals and giving time horizons through Fidelity Charitable’s investment pools or investment advi-
sor-managed accounts.” Fidelity 2015 Report at 3. 
40 As reported by the Treasury Department: “A sponsoring organization . . . may allow a donor to 
appoint a successor advisor for the DAF, e.g., a spouse, child, or other descendant, who would 
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donor can pass on to her heirs outside the property system, but only if the 
donor does not spend the money. In short, the DAF has converted a donor 
from a charitable spender to a charitable saver. 
In sum, viewed as public charity substitutes, contributions to national 
sponsoring organizations represent a delay to charity, pure and simple. In-
stead of receiving a contribution in year one, the art museum receives a con-
tribution in year two, or year three, four, five, or never. True, a contribution 
received later might be larger due to investment gains,41 but if the contribu-
tion was made in year one, the donee then could also have reaped those 
gains, and more importantly, would have had discretion about how best to 
use the funds, discretion that is deferred by the DAF intermediary.42 
The delay in charitable spending caused by DAFs at national sponsor-
ing organizations could be addressed broadly in one of two ways. One is to 
mandate an aggressive payout, far in excess of the private foundation pay-
out, to minimize the extent of the delay. Another would be to delay the char-
itable deduction for contributions to sponsoring organizations to match the 
distribution from the donor advised fund. Both approaches are discussed in 
more detail in Part II. 
C. DAFs as Vehicles for New Giving 
Another way to view DAFs are as vehicles that spur new charitable 
giving, i.e., money that but for the existence of DAFs would be privately 
consumed. Here, DAFs are not diverting contributions from one part of the 
charitable sector to another. Rather, DAFs are the reason donors give. For 
example, an investor with Schwab may have never made charitable contri-
butions before. But after hearing his friends and colleagues talk about their 
DAFs decides to open an account – either from peer pressure or just be-
cause the DAF appeals to his giving matrix in a way that other charities 
never did. 
DAFs also can be a source of supplemental giving. For instance, a do-
nor who regularly gives two percent of her income each year to active pub-
                                                                                                                           
continue to make recommendations regarding distributions from the account.” TREASURY RE-
PORT, at 22. 
 41 The contribution also could be smaller due to investment losses. 
 42 It is often noted that DAFs increase charitable giving through investment growth. Fidelity 
incorporates asset growth as part of its giving philosophy “Give, Grow, Grant,” and says that 
“[i]nvestment growth has generated $3.6 billion in additional charitable dollars.” Fidelity 2015 
Report at 12. Asset growth also is viewed not “as capital denied to charity [but] instead can be 
understood as a major philanthropic capital reserve fund.” Howard Husock, GROWING GIVING: 
AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY AND THE POTENTIAL OF DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS, 7 (Manhattan Insti-
tute, Apr. 2015). 
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lic charities decides upon creating a DAF to add DAF contributions to her 
giving profile, increasing overall giving to 2.5 percent of income each year. 
In addition, donor advised funds likely attract new charitable gifts 
when donors have a financial windfall, e.g., through inheritance or a bo-
nus.43 Here, the DAF offers a convenient way to make a large charitable gift 
both before the donor digests the windfall into her personal portfolio (be-
coming possessive of it) and without having immediately to select benefi-
ciaries, a burden that might otherwise have thwarted the gift.  
Also, as discussed in Part III, DAFs increasingly are used for contribu-
tions of complex assets, which other public charities might not accept and 
which are not tax preferred if given to a private foundation. This could rep-
resent new giving, at least to the extent that donors do not reduce other giv-
ing to compensate. 
As a source of new contributions, one course is to adopt a celebratory 
tone, and advocate a hands-off regulatory approach. After all, if regulation 
undermines the fundamental appeal of DAFs for donors, the risk is that 
DAFs as a catalyst for charitable giving would be eliminated, which would 
be woefully counterproductive. Further, why regulate at all? Just because 
the DAF is a bountiful vehicle should not mean that regulation must follow 
– like a moth to a flame. 
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that most DAF contributions to 
national sponsoring organizations ($8.72 billion in 2013)44 are new giving. 
People give what they can afford, which is why it is telling that individual 
giving as a percentage of disposable personal income has been largely fixed 
at two percent over a forty-year period.45 Regardless, even if all DAF con-
tributions to national sponsoring organizations were gifts that would not 
otherwise have been made, the federal government still has an interest in 
ensuring that the DAF works for the charitable sector as a whole, and not 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Fidelity reports that 27 percent and more than one-third of high net worth donors use do-
nor-advised funds to absorb financial windfalls. Fidelity 2015 Report at 22. 
 44 NPT 2014 Report at 9. 
 45 According to Giving USA, in both 1974 and 2014, individual giving as a percentage of 
disposable personal income (DPI) was two percent. In the intervening years, the percentage fluc-
tuated slightly above and below two percent, going as low as 1.7 percent (1995) and as high as 2.4 
percent (2000). This suggests that individuals in the aggregate give about two percent of DPI to 
charity, regardless of the giving vehicle. This is one indicator that DAFs primarily are substitutes 
and without them about the same amount of giving would occur. Giving USA Report for 2014 at 
244-45. A different “two percent” number – giving as a percentage of gross domestic product – is 
sometimes also used to assess whether giving levels change or remain constant over time. Giving 
USA also calculates this percentage (1.7 percent in 1974 and 2.1 percent in 2014). But this per-
centage is less useful than individual giving as a percentage of DPI because it uses “total giving” 
in the numerator. Total giving is not the same as new giving by individuals, but includes giving 
already counted as well as corporate giving. 
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just in preventing abuse. The question then becomes whether the accepted 
federal interest should be articulated through a mandated payout rule. 
PART II. A PAYOUT FOR DAFS AT NSOS AS FUNDRAISING ORGANIZATIONS 
The legal and policy challenge is to start from first principles. How 
should national sponsoring organizations be regulated? What is the appro-
priate role of the national sponsoring organization in the philanthropic sys-
tem? What are national sponsoring organizations good at? What are national 
sponsoring organizations good for? This Part of the Article characterizes the 
national sponsoring organization as a fundraising organization that meets its 
charitable objective through spending, and argues that a payout for national 
sponsoring organizations, mandated by Congress, is appropriate. 
A. Grounds for NSO Exempt Purpose 
A national sponsoring organization primarily collects, invests, and dis-
tributes charitable contributions; it does not perform a meaningful advisory 
role. Why is the NSO exempt as a 501(c)(3) organization at all? What is the 
exempt purpose? 
The exempt purpose of national sponsoring organizations is derived 
from a 1967 IRS Revenue Ruling.46 In the Ruling, the IRS held that an or-
ganization “formed for the purpose of providing financial assistance to sev-
eral different types of [501(c)(3)] organizations” was itself a 501(c)(3) or-
ganization.47 The organization carried “on no operations other than to re-
ceive contributions and incidental investment income and to make distribu-
tions of income to such exempt organizations at periodic intervals.”48 Under 
this line of legal authority, the plain basis for 501(c)(3) status of the  nation-
al sponsoring organization is that it makes grants to other organizations for 
charitable purposes.49 In other words, the purpose of fundraising is an ex-
empt purpose. 
What if the organization described in the Ruling received $1 million 
dollars a year, but only paid out $100 each year to charity? Should the or-
ganization nonetheless be recognized as a 501(c)(3)? What should it depend 
on? The organization is still “organized” for an exempt purpose – to pay out 
to charity. But is it “operated” primarily for an exempt purpose – i.e., does 
the failure to pay out money mean that the organization has failed the pri-
                                                                                                                           
 46 The ruling in turn is derived from a 1924 Supreme Court decision, Trinidad v. Sagrada 
Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). 
 47 Rev. Rul. 67-149, 1967-1 C.B. 133. 
 48 Id. 
 49 There are peripheral grounds for exemption – such as education of donors about philan-
thropy, but national sponsoring organizations are not educational organizations. 
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mary purpose test? The IRS would answer that whether the organization 
qualifies for 501(c)(3) status depends on whether the organization pays out 
commensurate with its financial resources, also known as the “commensu-
rate in scope” test. 
The IRS first articulated the commensurate in scope test in a 1964 
Revenue Ruling. The Ruling concerned an organization that owned and op-
erated a commercial office building. The principal source of income for the 
organization was rent from the building.50 The organization paid the rent it 
collected from commercial tenants to section 501(c)(3) organizations. As 
described by the IRS, “[t]he charitable purposes of the corporation are car-
ried out by aiding other charitable organizations, selected in the discretion 
of its governing body, through contributions and grants to such organiza-
tions for charitable purposes.”51 The organization would be entitled to ex-
emption “where it is shown to be carrying on through such contributions 
and grants a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial 
resources.”52 Translation – the fundraising purpose of the organization is 
sufficient, but exemption is contingent on whether the organization spends 
enough. 
The commensurate in scope test began as a tool to determine an organ-
ization’s primary purpose in cases where the activity of the organization is 
commercial in nature and not inherently charitable.53 The idea of commen-
surate in scope is a variation on the destination of income doctrine articulat-
ed by the Supreme Court in 1924 in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predica-
dores.54 As articulated in the Revenue Ruling, it is not enough for an organ-
ization to say it will pay money to charity (when that is the organization’s 
only purpose); it must also do it. 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Rent is passive income exempt from the unrelated business income tax. 
 51 Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. 
 52 Id. 
 53 For discussion of the commensurate in scope test, see Jack Siegel, Commensurate in Scope: 
Myth, Mystery, or Ghost?—Part One, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS (2008). See also Thomas Kelley, 
Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 
FORD. L. REV. 2437 (2005) (noting that the role of the commensurate in scope doctrine “appears 
to be to permit decision makers to approve of charitable status for commercial charities that have 
appealing missions and that spend most of their commercially raised funds on their charitable 
purposes”); John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WILL. & 
MARY L. REV. 487, 514 (2002) (discussing the commerciality doctrine and the commensurate in 
scope test). 
 54 263 U.S. 578 (1924). Under the destination of income test for exemption, what matters is 
not whether an organization’s activities are charitable, but the destination of the income from the 
activities. Congress responded to the destination of income test in 1950 by enacting a rule barring 
exempt status for feeder corporations, and with the unrelated business income tax. Destination of 
income as a basis for exempt status mostly remained intact, except in cases where the primary 
purpose of the organization is for profit trade or business activity. 
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The commensurate in scope test has led to considerable confusion be-
cause it is not clear when it applies,55 nor is it clear what the test requires 
when it does apply. As the IRS has said on numerous occasions: “[t]he 
‘commensurate test’ does not lend itself to rigid numerical distribution for-
mulas – there is no fixed percentage of income that an organization must 
pay out for charitable purposes.”56 Rather, “the particular facts and circum-
stances of the fund-raising organization must be considered.”57 
Regardless, in the context of  national sponsoring organizations, the 
important point is that the commensurate in scope test consistently has been 
applied to assess the exempt status of fundraising organizations.58 In other 
words, as fundraising organizations, national sponsoring organizations al-
ready are subject to a payout requirement, albeit an uncertain one. For ex-
ample, if an national sponsoring organization paid out no money to 
501(c)(3) organizations (and had no plan to do so), the sponsoring organiza-
tion should lose exempt status by failing the commensurate in scope test. As 
the IRS has said: “an organization that raises funds for charitable purposes 
but consistently uses virtually all its income for administrative and promo-
tional expenses with little or no distribution to charity cannot reasonably 
argue that its distributions are commensurate with its financial resources 
and capabilities.”59 
                                                                                                                           
 55 In 2007 and 2008, the specter of the commensurate in scope test was raised in connection 
with university endowments. See Jack Siegel, Commensurate in Scope: Myth, Mystery, or 
Ghost?—Part Two, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS (2009) (citing letter dated 5/29/07 from Sens. Max 
Baucus and Charles Grassley to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson suggesting the Treasury 
and IRS should “put teeth” into the commensurate in scope test). 
 56  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989, M. SPECIAL 
EMPHASIS PROGRAM – CHARITABLE FUND-RAISING 13. 
 57 Id. at 14. 
 58 Id. at 13 (“Whether a fund-raising organization’s activity may be said to accomplish ex-
empt purposes often centers on the issue of whether there has been a sufficient turnover of funds 
to charity. This issue is resolved through use of the ‘commensurate test’ . . . .”); INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECH-
NICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986, G. UPDATE ON FUNDRAISING 3 (noting 
that the commensurate in scope test “remains the basis by which such fundraisers are tested. If this 
test is met, exemption will not be foreclosed to an organization notwithstanding that its primary 
fundraising activity in carrying out its purposes is not inherently charitable or is an unrelated trade 
or business.”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFES-
SIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982, L. 
FUNDRAISING 48 (“The commensurate test has been used as the dominant rationale for fund rais-
ing event exemption cases in recent years” but has been applied “with confusion and inconsisten-
cy.”). 
 59  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989, M. SPECIAL 
EMPHASIS PROGRAM – CHARITABLE FUND-RAISING 14. 
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In addition, notwithstanding that the fundraising rationale for exempt 
status is longstanding, the 501(c)(3) fundraising organization stands at the 
edge of legitimacy. Charity is accomplished in the doing. To grant “charita-
ble” status60 to a shell seems awkward and counterintuitive. Thus, in order 
to achieve 501(c)(3) status as a fundraiser, the formalities are important. For 
example, if a fundraising organization contracts with 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions to solicit, collect, and distribute the collected contributions for a fee, 
the fundraising organization does not qualify as a 501(c)(3). Even though 
the organization’s “activities consist entirely of providing fundraising ser-
vices to organizations,” exempt status fails because the services here are a 
commercial fee-for-service activity and the organization did not retain con-
trol of the funds.61 Although the distinction with a national sponsoring or-
ganization is clear, both organizations perform essentially the same function 
– fundraising for charity.62 Section 501(c)(3) status turns on formalism. 
Fundraising organizations face an additional hurdle, namely acute con-
cerns about private inurement and private benefit. For an organization to 
qualify as a 501(c)(3), the organization must not inure to the benefit of or-
ganization insiders,63 and must serve “a public rather than a private inter-
est.” 64  In the fundraising context, it is not uncommon for the putative 
501(c)(3) organization to have pre-existing relationships with for-profit 
companies that benefit from the fundraising activity.65 Thus, the IRS will 
conclude that even if a charity benefits from the fundraising, the fundraising 
                                                                                                                           
 60  Contributions to any 501(c)(3) organization technically are “charitable” contributions. 
I.R.C. § 170(c). 
 61 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201438029 (concluding that “[y]our fundraising services do not consti-
tute the provision of grants to charities, rather they are services that are bought by the charities”). 
 62 At bottom, the fees collected by the sponsoring organization come from the same source as 
the organization in the ruling – out of donor contributions. 
 63 The Code requires that for an organization to qualify as a 501(c)(3) “no part of the net 
earnings [may inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” 
 64 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). The regulation further provides: “it is necessary for an 
organization to establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such 
as designated individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.” 
 65 In a pithy summary of the legal hurdles facing fundraising organizations: “If the ‘commen-
surate test is met, an organization may qualify for exempt status under IRC 501(c)(3) notwith-
standing the fact that the fund-raising activity itself is not inherently charitable or is an unrelated 
trade or business. However, even if an organization makes a real and substantial contribution to 
charity commensurate with its financial resources, a substantial private purpose may still be found 
that will disqualify it from IRC 501(c)(3) exemption.” INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1989, M. SPECIAL EMPHASIS PROGRAM – CHARITABLE FUND-
RAISING 14-15. 
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organization is not exempt because of the private benefit that flows to a re-
lated entity.66 
Again, the comparison to national sponsoring organizations is rele-
vant.67 Private benefit concerns have long dogged national sponsoring or-
ganizations. The for-profit arms of Fidelity, Vanguard, Schwab, and other 
commercial investment firms that sponsor DAFs all benefit from the fees 
earned by DAF accounts. 
All that said, national sponsoring organizations indubitably are recog-
nized as 501(c)(3) public charities. Whatever private benefit exists in cur-
rent arrangements would appear unlikely at this stage to jeopardize exempt 
status. It also is unlikely that the IRS would challenge exempt status based 
on the commensurate in scope test given reported aggregate payout levels 
by many sponsoring organizations.68 Nevertheless, even though the public 
charity status of national sponsoring organizations has been established, the 
case for exempt status is qualitatively weak. As a fundraising organization, 
the national sponsoring organization qualifies on the basest of grounds – 
paying out to others – and amidst concerns about private benefit. 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201438029 (concluding that in addition to not having an exempt 
purpose, the organization provided a substantial private benefit because the organization was 
founded by a for-profit company, four of its six directors are related through their work with the 
company, the organization licensed a product owned by the company, and had a management 
agreement with the company whereby the organization paid the company $25,000 a month plus 2 
percent of all of the donations). 
 67 Private benefit concerns were rife at the time sponsoring organizations were seeking ex-
emption, though eventually turned out not to be a bar. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999, O. DONOR CONTROL; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION 
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1996 M. DONOR DIRECTED FUNDS. Albert R. Rodriguez, The Tax-
Exempt Status of Commercially Sponsored Donor-Advised Funds, 17 EXEMPT. ORG. TAX REV. 95 
(1997). The issue though continues to simmer. Relatedly, the Treasury released private benefit 
regulations, which could affect the calculation going forward. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1). 
The IRS has applied the regulations to disqualify organizations “where a charity was essentially 
required to use the services of a particular commercial entity, even where the fees charged repre-
sented fair market value.” See PAUL STRECKFUS, EO TAX JOURNAL 2015-164, Commercial DAFs 
and Private Benefit (comments of Marcus Owens). Owens notes that one possible issue is “wheth-
er ‘commercial DAFs,’ e.g., DAFs formed and managed by commercial investment businesses, 
are incompatible with notions of private benefit as set forth in the 2008 private benefit regulations 
(and the private benefit court decisions). Will we ever see, for example, Fidelity Charitable Gift 
Fund turning to Vanguard or Schwab for investment and sales management? Will Schwab or 
Vanguard sales representatives ever recommend Fidelity Charitable Gift funds to clients?”). But 
see Husock, supra note 42, at 6 (“Ultimately, the debate over DAFs is one not about fees that may 
flow to private financial firms but about whether the U.S. wants to encourage growth in charitable 
giving as a portion of the economy.”). 
 68 The IRS could argue that the commensurate test requires a sponsoring organization to have 
in place a policy that each DAF account spend commensurate with its resources. 
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B. A Fund-Based Payout in Fulfillment of Exempt Purpose 
The legal background regarding the 501(c)(3) status of national spon-
soring organizations is relevant, less for what the IRS should or may do 
based on existing law, but whether Congress should establish a policy and 
write special rules for national sponsoring organizations. The short answer 
is yes, Congress should. DAFs at national sponsoring organizations should 
be welcomed as a tool further to promote a culture of giving. But the wel-
come should be at arm’s length. 
Congress should channel the national sponsoring organization to do 
the most for charity. Congress should recognize that not all DAF contribu-
tions represent new giving, but come at a cost to active public charities. 
Further, DAF accounts are not the same as private foundations – where per-
petual life is useful to foster institutional permanence and innovation. Ra-
ther, as a fundraising organization, the 501(c)(3) mission of the national 
sponsoring organization, the basis for its exempt status, is to spend money. 
The principal issue is quite simply the appropriate rate of spending. Con-
gress, not national sponsoring organizations, not donors, and not the IRS, 
should set this rate. 
In the DAF context, Congress should apply the commensurate in scope 
test with a bright line. Congress should require that each DAF of a national 
sponsoring organization pay out each contribution within a range of five to 
fifteen years.69 Whatever number Congress settles on (be it a five year pay-
out or fifteen), what matters is that the payout be set so that it is long 
enough so that the appeal of DAFs for donors that would not otherwise give 
is not undermined, but not be so long that the delay to charity that results 
due to donors who use DAFs as public charity substitutes is not excessive. 
In other words, the ideal spending period would be one that does not deter 
too many new donors while limiting the net detriment to charity that occurs 
when DAFs are used as public charity substitutes. To the extent that DAF 
contributions are in lieu of private foundation contributions, there is no is-
sue except that these donors may opt for a private foundation instead of a 
DAF in search of a lower payout (but more control). 
National sponsoring organizations generally object to a payout. One 
objection is that a payout is unnecessary. Many national sponsoring organi-
zations claim already to pay out at high levels and so argue that a payout is 
                                                                                                                           
 69 In theory, the payout rate could be as high as 100 percent, on the view that, notwithstanding 
that formal legal control is vested in the sponsoring organization, national sponsoring organiza-
tions are essentially conduits, and as substitutes for gifts to other public charities, the distribution 
should be delayed no longer than necessary. Although a 100 percent payout may sound extreme, a 
similar payout is used to permit conduit foundations to be eligible for the 50 percent limitation. 
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vii), 170(b)(1)(F)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(g) (“p]rivate nonoperating 
foundation distributing amount equal to all contributions received”). 
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redundant. This objection though is beside the point. Regardless of current 
payout levels, a mandated payout would standardize expectations for na-
tional sponsoring organizations and donors and end disputes about how 
payouts are calculated70 and whether payouts are high enough. Further, for 
national sponsoring organizations that already pay out at a high level, a 
mandate would not change behavior. For national sponsoring organizations 
that do not make substantial payouts, a mandate would accelerate spending, 
which would be the point. 
Further, the payout levels reported by sponsoring organizations are at 
the aggregate level, not the fund level. Payout should be at the fund level. 
The reasoning is straightforward. Donors that create DAFs and do not ad-
vise a pay out, or pay out very slowly, are a main reason for a payout. These 
are the donors that most need a push to spend and who, for whatever reason, 
are indecisive. The ability to use a DAF is a benefit to the indecisive donor, 
but the law should not tolerate limitless indecision. The point is to spend the 
money not to save it. 
Moreover, if the payout is objectionable to these donors, then what are 
the consequences? One is that the donor instead funds a private foundation 
– but this is not necessarily a bad outcome. If the donor’s motives are to 
establish a perpetual institution, then the foundation is the appropriate 
form.71 Some might argue that donors should not be encouraged to incur the 
expense of a private foundation, especially if the whole point of DAFs is as 
a convenient alternative to the private foundation.72 But as discussed earlier, 
to the extent DAFs are used as private foundation substitutes, the DAF rep-
resents a loophole, which a high payout would close. In addition, some do-
nors that now object to a payout might, once a payout is the law, accept it as 
reasonable, along with the preferred tax status of the sponsoring organiza-
tion over a private foundation. 
                                                                                                                           
70 It is beyond the scope of this Article to address payout calculations in detail. One approach 
might be for national sponsoring organizations to maintain annual subaccounts for each donor. 
Contributions made during the year to the account would be added together and the account would 
be closed to additional contributions at the end of the year. The account (including any gains) then 
would be spent down within the spend-down period. A definition of a qualifying distribution also 
would be required, for example, to prevent distributions from one DAF to another DAF. 
 71 Another possible alternative is that the donor instead contributes to a DAF at a community 
foundation. In depth discussion of how community foundations may be distinguished from nation-
al sponsoring organizations is outside the scope of this Article but is an important issue. 
 72 The Treasury Department noted that: “[a]necdotal reports suggest that some smaller private 
foundations are being advised to consider choosing to ‘reorganize’ as DAFs by transferring all 
assets to a DAF and terminating the private foundation.” TREASURY REPORT, at 29. A spend 
down of assets need not mean an end to foundation conversions, but would change the calculation 
for small foundations, perhaps in a positive way. Foundations could trade for a less expensive and 
restrictive regulatory environment but give up perpetual life.  
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Another possible consequence of a fund-based payout is that some do-
nors might not give to charity at all. In other words, the payout could have 
the effect policymakers should seek to avoid – driving away new charitable 
donors and thus encouraging private consumption. But a donor’s decision 
not to give because of a high fund-based payout also is not a bad outcome 
in this context. Under present law, the donor has taken a charitable deduc-
tion, but is not spending the money. The point of the DAF at a national 
sponsoring organization should be to attract new charitable money, and also 
to encourage donors to spend it. The DAF at a national sponsoring organi-
zation is a charitable spending vehicle – that is the basis for the sponsor’s 
exemption. Donors should know when giving that perpetuity is not an op-
tion. 
A final objection to a fund-based payout is that it would be an adminis-
trative burden on the sponsoring organization. Sponsoring organizations 
would have to calculate distribution requirements for each fund, inform do-
nors of their obligations, and make distributions when donors fail to provide 
advice. This would be a burden, and the costs would undoubtedly be passed 
on to donor accounts through higher administrative fees for account 
maintenance. Nevertheless, sponsoring organizations already have access to 
account balance information and the timing of contributions and distribu-
tions. Fidelity for example reports that “[m]ost contributions to Fidelity 
Charitable are granted out to charities within 10 years, based on a first-in, 
first-out analysis of contributions and grants.”73 
An alternative to a payout would be to delay the charitable deduction 
until the DAF makes a distribution. A delayed deduction approach would be 
to opt for substance over form and in effect treat the sponsoring organiza-
tion as a conduit or agent. A similar approach has been used in other cir-
cumstances. For example, in Revenue Ruling 85-184,74 a charity designated 
a public utility its authorized agent to collect voluntary contributions on the 
charity’s behalf from the utility’s customers. The utility exercised no domin-
ion or control over the funds. The IRS held that the customers were allowed 
a charitable deduction in the year the utility paid the funds to the charity, 
not when the customer paid the funds to the utility. Although national spon-
soring organizations are distinguishable from the utility in the Revenue Rul-
ing, national sponsoring organizations again are on the edge – relying in 
large part on legal formalities for beneficial treatment. 
Delaying the charitable deduction until the DAF distribution would 
likely be as effective as a payout, if not more so, at speeding up distribu-
tions. Indecisive donors generally would seek to accelerate deductions and 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Fidelity 2015 Giving Report at 4. 
 74 1985-2 C.B. 84. 
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reach a decision far more quickly than the payout period. This approach, 
however, likely would have the effect of ending the DAF at national spon-
soring organizations, the main appeal of which is a current deduction but 
delayed decision.75 Again, this is not necessarily a bad result, except to the 
extent that DAF contributions represent new giving. 
Donor advised funds at national sponsoring organizations are now a 
proven fundraising vehicle. Congress should take steps to ensure that donor 
advised funds also become institutionalized as a spending vehicle. Donors 
who are attracted by the convenience and efficiency of national sponsoring 
organizations will not be deterred by a reasonable mandate to distribute de-
ducted contributions over an appropriate period. Donors who are deterred 
have other giving choices. Donors who choose not to give are the donors 
who probably should not be receiving federal income tax deductions for 
DAF contributions in any event. 
PART III. A NET BENEFIT APPROACH FOR NONCASH ASSET 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
A. The Broken System of Non-Cash Asset Donations and the Growing Role 
of DAFs 
The donor-advised fund is emerging as a key source of non-cash chari-
table contributions. The Fidelity Charitable Gift fund reports that in 2014, 
“more than half of Fidelity Charitable donor contributions were made with 
non-cash assets,”76 that “[n]early two-thirds of donors set up or use their 
DAFs to donate appreciated assets,” 77  and “[s]ince inception, Fidelity 
Charitable has assisted in converting $2.4 billion of illiquid assets into char-
itable dollars available for grants.”78 The National Philanthropic Trust con-
curs, noting that: “contributing illiquid assets to DAFs continues to be an 
increasingly popular trend.” 79  Policymakers should take note. Donor-
advised funds present an opportunity to improve the current broken system 
of noncash contributions. 
Charitable contributions of noncash assets (property) are a long-
standing source of concern, for reasons that have nothing to do with donor 
advised funds. What began as a simple notion – a charitable deduction for 
donated assets – has become an immensely complicated cacophony of woe-
fully nontransparent rules that are inefficient, inequitable, promote abusive 
transactions, harm the reputation of the nonprofit sector, and in many cases 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Substantiation issues also would arise. 
 76 Fidelity 2015 Giving Report at 4. 
 77 Fidelity 2015 Giving Report at 22. 
 78 Fidelity 2015 Giving Report at 11. 
 79 NPT 2014 Report at 11. 
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yield an uncertain benefit to charity. The issues range from pure matters of 
policy to administration and include: allowing a deduction for unrealized 
appreciation, uncertain valuation of donated assets, the net benefit that in-
ures to charity (the donee), tax incentives that encourage property over cash 
contributions, and complexity. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to present each issue in 
detail80 a brief summary of the rules and issues raised may be helpful and is 
necessary to provide context. A simple example serves as a useful starting 
point. Assume that a donor owns 100 shares of publicly traded stock and 
donates the stock to a 501(c)(3) organization. At the time of the donation, 
the stock is trading at $10 a share. What is the donor’s deduction? The gen-
eral rule is that a charitable deduction is allowed for property contributions 
equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the contribu-
tion.81 Thus, the deduction would be $1,000.82 This seems a reasonable re-
sult, since the donor has parted with property worth $1,000. But what if the 
donor paid only $1 for each share of stock, or $100 total? If so, the donor is 
allowed a $1,000 deduction (to shelter wage income) even though the tax 
cost of the property was just $100. This ability to deduct unrealized (i.e., 
untaxed) appreciation has been widely condemned.83 
In addition, what if within days of the donation, the stock value plung-
es 65 percent. Worried about further devaluation of the stock, the donee 
charity sells the stock for $350. Does the amount of the deduction change? 
No, the deduction is based on date-of-contribution value of $1,000, not date 
of sale value. This too may seem reasonable. Someone has to bear the risk 
of loss. Since the donor has parted with legal control of the asset, the risk of 
loss should pass to the donee as an incident of ownership. On the other 
hand, it is not just the charity that bears the risk of loss, but taxpayers gen-
erally. The taxpayers, through the charitable deduction, have subsidized a 
                                                                                                                           
 80 For extensive discussion, see Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A 
Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263 (2013). 
 81 I.R.C. § 170(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1)(2012). 
 82 If the donor held the property for one year or less, then the deduction is equal to the donor’s 
cost basis in the stock. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). 
 83 Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. 
L. REV. 687, 720 (1999) (“inefficient and unfair”); Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of 
Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) (“inequi-
table”); Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1158 (“inequita-
ble”); Calvin H. Johnson, Ain’t Charity: Disallowing Deduction for Kept Resources, 128 TAX 
NOTES 545, 549 (2010) (a “mistake”); Richard Schmalbeck, Gifts and the Income Tax – An En-
during Puzzle, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 89 (2010) (“a clear error”). See also Harvey P. 
Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX 
LAW. 331, 359 (2015) (noting that in 2011, 41 percent of noncash contributions were claimed by 
individuals earning $1 million or more of adjusted gross income, or .747 percent of total returns). 
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gift of $1,000. If the actual benefit to charity is less than $1,000, taxpayers 
bear some of the burden by in effect overpaying for the donation.84 
What if instead of publicly traded stock, the donor contributes illiquid 
property, like privately traded securities or real estate? Now, the rules di-
verge based on the type of donee organization. If the illiquid property is 
donated to a (nonoperating) private foundation, then the deduction is lim-
ited to the donor’s cost basis, i.e., the donor is not allowed to deduct unreal-
ized appreciation, and thus neither of the two issues above matter.85 
If the illiquid property is donated to a public charity, then as before, the 
donor is allowed to deduct unrealized appreciation based on the date of con-
tribution value.86 In addition, unlike with publicly traded stock, illiquid as-
sets raise the stakes of relying on date of contribution value to determine the 
amount of the deduction. The value of publicly traded stock, though varia-
ble from day to day, at least is based on exchange value – a verifiable 
amount equal to what buyers and sellers pay in market-based arm’s length 
transactions. 
By contrast, illiquid assets do not have a similarly objective measure 
for value. Unlike in a market transaction, where buyers and sellers negotiate 
a value and a price, in a donative transaction, market pressure is absent. In-
stead, the value of illiquid assets must be determined by third-party apprais-
ers, hired by the donor. The donor has an incentive to inflate the value (be-
cause it leads to a higher deduction). The donee is not responsible for valu-
ing the asset, and generally has an institutional interest in not challenging 
donor valuations (so as not to alienate donors). Further, the donee also gen-
erally benefits from a higher valuation, which increases on paper the 
amount of public support received by the donee. 
In short, in a donative transaction of illiquid assets to a public charity, 
the principal check on valuation abuse is the Internal Revenue Service.87 
For the IRS effectively to police property contributions is a daunting task. 
Many overvaluations will go unchallenged. And challenges when mounted 
are time consuming and expensive.88 In short, the inherent uncertainty in 
                                                                                                                           
 84 In this (admittedly dramatic) example, if the donor is in the 39.6 percent tax bracket, the 
donor takes a $1,000 deduction, which is worth $396 to the donor. The charity gets $350, meaning 
that it cost the federal government $396 to deliver $350 to charity. 
 85 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii). If the illiquid property is depreciated (i.e., has a value less than 
the donor’s basis), then the deduction is fair market value, and valuation still is a concern. 
 86 An appraisal is required. The appraisal must be dated no earlier than 60 days before the 
contribution and no later than the due date for filing the return. Treas. Reg. 1.170A-13(c)(3). 
 87 The secondary check on valuation is the integrity of the appraisal process. The regulations 
define appraisal standards. In addition, there are penalties on donors (and appraisers) for overvalu-
ation all in an effort to get to an accurate value of contributed property. I.R.C. §§ 6662, 6695A. 
 88 For extensive discussion, see Colinvaux supra note 80, at 282-89. 
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valuation adds to the cost of the donation – in administrative time and ex-
pense, and by overpaying for the subsidy. 
Further, the cost of the donation should be viewed not just from the 
perspective of the tax system and the public fisc, but also from the donee’s 
perspective. Accepting property donations is not costless. Donees incur car-
rying costs (maintenance, insurance, etc.) and expenses related to sale. This 
again raises an incongruity between the net benefit to charity from a dona-
tion, and the amount allowed as a deduction, which, again, is based on an 
uncertain date of contribution value.89 
If the property is tangible personal property, like clothing, household 
items, collectibles, or artwork, another set of rules applies. If made to a pri-
vate foundation, the donor is limited to a deduction of basis (unless the 
property is worth less than the donor’s basis, in which case the deduction is 
the fair market value of the property).90 If made to a public charity, a fair 
market value deduction is allowed if the property is for the donee’s use in 
exempt programs (known as a “related use”).91 Otherwise, the deduction is 
limited to the donor’s basis. (As with private foundations, if the property is 
worth less than the donor’s basis, the deduction is fair market value.) In ad-
dition, special rules exist for certain types of tangible personal property (ve-
hicles, fractional interests of artwork, taxidermy) adding to the overall com-
plexity.92 There are also distinct rules for contributions of inventory and 
intangible property.93 
The donor advised fund enters this array of rules as a magnet for non-
cash contributions of all kinds, but especially of illiquid assets.94 As a public 
charity, contributions to DAF sponsoring organizations receive the more 
favorable treatment – the ability to deduct unrealized appreciation95 – than 
the same contribution to a private foundation.96 This is one reason to believe 
                                                                                                                           
 89 The industry relating to processing noncash contributions is substantial. Consider the web-
site for Charitable Solutions, LLC, a “planned giving risk management consulting firm” that fo-
cuses on non-cash asset receipt and disposition, among other services. The firm notes on its home 
page that non-cash donations are one of only “two types of gifts in which a charity can actually 
lose more money than the original gift.” The firm has a relationship with the Dechomai Founda-
tion, which helps charities “eliminate their non-cash risks.” See www.charitablesolutionsllc.com. 
 90 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i). 
 91 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i)(I). 
 92 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iv), (f)(12), (o). 
 93 I.R.C. § 170(e)(3), (m). 
 94 Fidelity reports that “[t]hree-quarters of donors say the ability to donate [noncash] assets is 
a reason they set up or use a donor-advised fund” Fidelity 2015 Report at 4. 
 95 Fidelity reports that 78 percent of donors use or set up a DAF “[t]o potentially minimize 
capital gains taxes.” Fidelity 2015 Report at 22. 
 96 Property contributions to public charities also are subject to a more generous cap (30 per-
cent of adjusted gross income) than property contributions to private foundations (20 percent of 
adjusted gross income). I.R.C. § 170(b). 
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that for some contributions, donors may use a donor-advised fund instead of 
a private foundation.97 
As one example, in marketing materials Fidelity relays the experience 
of a donor who was preparing to sell his interest in a privately held compa-
ny: 
‘I wanted to create an ongoing charitable concern, something to 
serve as a legacy for me and my whole family. I thought first of 
establishing a private foundation, but found there were two prob-
lems: one, that donating privately held stock to a private founda-
tion is not a tax-efficient option, and two, that the administrative 
challenges were considerable and expensive. Establishing a DAF 
at the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund was absolutely the best op-
tion.’98 
Apart from tax advantages, which sponsoring organizations share with 
any other public charity, sponsoring organizations market themselves as the 
more efficient vehicle for converting complex assets into cash, and increas-
ing the net benefit to charity. Again, according to Fidelity: 
 Many non-profit organizations, being primarily mission- and 
program-focused, are not well-equipped to handle this type of 
contribution [(non publicly traded assets)] . . . . Further, while 
some charitable organizations might have some limited experi-
ence in handling contributions of non-publicly traded assets, the 
cost to the charity to outsource the compliance and liquidation 
work can be considerable. Although the donor would still be eli-
gible to claim a fair market value deduction, the net result to the 
charity would once again be significantly reduced . . . . 
 In many cases, an optimal method for donating non-publicly 
traded assets to charity – measured by cost, flexibility, simplicity, 
and tax benefits to the donor, as well as by maximizing the net 
proceeds ultimately made available to charitable organizations – 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Giving USA reported on a multi-million dollar donation split between the donor’s private 
foundation and a donor advised fund. In general, for tax planning purposes, it would make sense 
to give cash and public securities to the private foundation and illiquid assets to the DAF. The 
DAF then could fund the same causes as the private foundation (under the donor’s name), and the 
private foundation could make distributions to the DAF in satisfaction of the foundation’s payout 
requirement. (DAFs are subject to the excess business holdings rules, meaning that they cannot be 
used to avoid this aspect of the private foundation regime.) 
 98  Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, “Donating Complex Assets to Charity” available at: 
http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-strategies/tax-estate-planning/donate-non-publicly-
traded-assets.shtml. 
 Roger Colinvaux 121 
is to make the contribution to a charity that offers donor-advised 
funds.99 
In other words, Fidelity argues that donors with complex assets should, 
as a matter of public interest, give to a DAF instead of another public chari-
ty. Other public charities are not in the business of buying and selling assets, 
and so will drive up the costs of the transaction, resulting in less benefit to 
charity. It is much better Fidelity says to give the asset to a DAF sponsoring 
organization, have the sponsoring organization sell the asset, and then dis-
tribute the proceeds to charity from the donor’s DAF account – less “any 
applicable unrelated business income tax, . . . actual carrying and mainte-
nance costs, and certain tax preparation consultancy costs,”100 which are 
taken from the proceeds of the sale. In either case, the donor’s deduction 
will be the same – and based on the date of contribution value. But if a DAF 
is used, the amount actually distributed to a “mission” or “program” fo-
cused charity will be greater. 
The marketing materials are suggestive. Clearly, sponsoring organiza-
tions are competing for the noncash contribution business,101 indicating that 
some DAF contributions are substitutes (both for other public charity gifts, 
and private foundation giving), not new giving. More important though is 
the likely trend: 
Until recently, non-publicly traded assets were a largely untapped 
source of philanthropic funding, in part because these assets can 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id (emphasis added). The other major national gift funds have similar materials. Vanguard 
Charitable, “Donating illiquid assets: Non-publicly traded stock,” May 20, 2015, available at: 
https://www.vanguardcharitable.org/blog/blog_donating_illiquid_assets_non_publicly_traded_sto
ck/ (“Many charities – especially small to mid-sized ones – do not have the resources to accept 
this type of asset.); Schwab Charitable, “Why it Might Make Sense to Donate Your Best Invest-
ments Instead of Cash: Appreciated Assets Can Be Among the Most Tax-Advantaged Items to 
Contribute to Charity,” May 2013, available at: http://www.schwabcharitable.org/public/file/P-
7256879/Complex_Assets_Donating_Appreciated_Assets.pdf (“Unfortunately, not all charities 
have the resources or capabilities to accept gifts of appreciated investments directly. That’s where 
donor advised fund accounts can come in handy. These charitable accounts. . . allow you to more 
easily convert appreciated investments into tax-effective charitable contributions. This is because 
the sponsoring charity may have more experience with these types of gifts and can be in a better 
position to evaluate prospective contributions of appreciated property and liquidate the property 
once it is donated.”); National Philanthropic Trust, “Illiquid Asset Contribution Guidelines,” 
available at: http://www.nptrust.org/daf-forms/Illiquid-Asset-Contribution-Guidelines.pdf. 
 100 Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, “Donating Complex Assets to Charity.” Other gift funds 
have similar models. 
 101 The Fidelity materials say that the mission-driven public charity “might require that a 
donor first sell the assets and contribute the proceeds. A donor in this situation would have taxable 
income and thus would not, in most cases, choose to donate the entire amount of the proceeds.” Id. 
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be complicated for individuals to give and for some nonprofits to 
accept.102 
As a hint of untapped sources of funding to come, Fidelity cites to a report 
by Deloitte Consulting, which states that: “the top one percent of all U.S. 
households hold 36 percent of their wealth in privately held businesses.”103 
In short, Fidelity believes that the donor advised fund is the uniquely ap-
propriate vehicle for attracting new charitable contributions of complex as-
sets, and that the potential market is significant.104 
Further, the target property is varied. In “The art of donating property,” 
Vanguard Charitable promotes the contributions of “fine art, real estate, ve-
hicles, and other illiquid assets.”105 In “Minimize capital gains by donating 
complex assets” Vanguard Charitable lists a number of primary asset types, 
including: non-publicly traded stock, an LLC or LLP interest, private equi-
ty, hedge fund interest, restricted stock, insurance policy, and “other.”106 
Schwab Charitable has a similar list, with the addition of “collectibles and 
artwork.”107 The Boston Foundation noted the gift of a share in a cruise 
ship.108 
The push by sponsoring organizations, especially national sponsoring 
organizations, for noncash contributions raises another legal question re-
garding their 501(c)(3) status. As already discussed, national sponsoring 
organizations as primarily fundraising organizations are at the edge of 
                                                                                                                           
 102 Fidelity 2015 Report at 11 (emphasis added). 
 103 Fidelity 2015 Report at 11 (citing Deloitte Consulting, LLP, “The Next Decade in Global 
Giving Among Millionaire Households,” 2011). 
 104 Of total contributions to Fidelity in 2014, nine percent were of non-publicly traded assets, 
46 percent were publicly traded securities, and 45 percent cash. Fidelity 2015 Report at 11. Fideli-
ty is not alone in this belief, as the marketing materials of other sponsoring organizations suggest. 
 105 Vanguard Charitable, available at: https://www.vanguardcharitable.org/blog/blog_the_art_
of_donating_property/. 
 106 Vanguard Charitable, available at: https://cdn.unite529.com/f/248/21630/7d/im.uprinv.com/
rc/sr2/vcep/VSAS_062015.pdf. 
 107 See supra note 99. The donation of art and collectibles that are worth less than the donor’s 
basis are deductible at fair market value. Although valuation is a concern, donors are not able to 
deduct unrealized appreciation. If the property is appreciated property, however, then a fair market 
value deduction is allowed (i.e., donors may deduct unrealized appreciation) only if the property is 
for the related use of the donee. Some sponsoring organizations may be using other intermediaries 
to satisfy the related use test. In “The art of donating property,” Vanguard Charitable describes 
one donation of fine art, where Vanguard partnered with a for-profit company and a related foun-
dation to process the art donation and transfer the proceeds to the donor’s DAF at Vanguard. The 
details are not clear – but illustrate the fact that multiple entities can be involved – perhaps for tax 
planning purposes. 
 108 The Boston Foundation, Valuing Non-Cash Assets for Charity: What Donors Need to 
Know, available at available at: http://www.tbf.org/tbf/65/complex-assets (noting that “[t]he Inter-
nal Revenue Service requires that [non-cash] assets be valued, a sometimes difficult task for 
things like illiquid company stock, land, privately held corporations or anything else not price by a 
public market”). 
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501(c)(3) exempt status. As a shell, national sponsoring organizations must 
avoid characterization as a feeder organization, spend in accordance with 
their resources, and must remain vigilant against private benefit and inure-
ment from relationships with affiliated for-profit investment firms. Now, a 
deepening involvement in managing complex asset donations further mud-
dies the waters. 
For example, in two private letter rulings, the IRS considered and re-
jected the 501(c)(3) status of organizations that were formed to facilitate 
donations of noncash property. In a 2005 ruling, an organization sought ex-
emption as “a facilitator to contributors who want to donate tangible per-
sonal property, such as boats, to a charity that the donors designate.”109 The 
IRS said that: 
Arranging for donors for the charitable contribution of their boats, 
by taking possession and title to the boats; by arranging with third 
parties for their moorage, for necessary repairs and upgrades, and 
for sales by brokers; and by paying the net sales proceeds to the 
charity designated by the donor, all constitute common commer-
cial activities, rather than activities that further a charitable pur-
pose.110 
The IRS concluded that the organization was “organized and operated for 
the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business,” i.e., a 
feeder organization. Similarly, in a 2008 ruling the question raised was: 
“Does an organization formed to facilitate donations of real estate qualify 
for exemption”111 under section 501(c)(3)? The IRS said that: “The facilita-
tion of real estate transactions through for-profit third party entities for a fee 
constitutes a trade or business ordinarily carried on for profit.”112 
On the surface, the comparison to sponsoring organizations is obvious. 
Sponsoring organizations are engaged in the same basic activities as the 
organizations in the rulings. But there are important possible distinctions. A 
key conclusion for the IRS in both rulings was that the organizations were 
deemed to be the agents of the donor, which imbued the sales activity with 
more of a commercial hue. Thus, the organization was judged to be provid-
ing commercial services for the donor (and also, incidentally, would have 
sheltered the donor from capital gains taxes). Whether sponsoring organiza-
tions can be characterized as agents for their donors returns to the essential 
nature of “donor advice” in the donor-advised fund context. 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200512027 (Mar. 25, 2005). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200825051 (June 20, 2008). 
 112 Id. 
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Another distinction is that the organizations in the rulings did not en-
gage in other activities.113 Sponsoring organizations are not exclusively in 
the noncash asset business. But as this business increasingly becomes a 
primary activity, if it is not already,114 the overall purposes of sponsoring 
organizations as charitable or not will again be called into question. 
All of this leads to questions about how, as a matter of public policy, 
Congress should respond to the increasing use of sponsoring organizations 
to process noncash charitable contributions. As the sponsoring organiza-
tions state, there are reasons to think that sponsoring organizations are a 
more efficient vehicle than other public charities for accepting many kinds 
of noncash contributions, especially illiquid assets. Because sponsoring or-
ganizations specialize in the liquidation of complex assets, they are better 
positioned to reduce transaction costs, potentially making more cash availa-
ble to mission driven charities. 
In addition, the ability to liquidate a complex asset for the benefit of 
multiple charities is also an attractive feature of using a donor-advised fund 
in this context. Without a DAF, the contribution of indivisible property must 
go to a single charity (if tax benefits are to be preserved).115 Further, the 
intricacies of complex asset donation likely have depressed the market. The 
sophistication offered by many sponsoring organizations likely does repre-
sent an opportunity to release an “untapped” source of charitable contribu-
tions.116 
On the other hand, as yet more complex, and inherently difficult-to-
value assets are contributed, the opportunities for abuse will multiply, as 
will administrative costs, overpayments of the subsidy by the federal gov-
ernment, and equitable concerns that the deduction favors the wealthiest. 
The charitable deduction already is claimed disproportionately by those at 
the very top of the income distribution.117 DAFs, by providing a lucrative 
deduction for the top “one percent,”118 will put further pressure on the chari-
table deduction generally. 
                                                                                                                           
 113 The extent to which sponsoring organizations rely on for-profit firms to process transac-
tions may also be a distinction. Schwab says that it accepts non-cash assets “via a charitable in-
termediary, with proceeds of your donation transferred to your donor-advised account upon liqui-
dation.” Schwab, supra note 99, at 4 (fine print). 
 114 Fidelity in 2014 received more contributions in noncash assets than cash. Fidelity 2015 
Report at 11. 
 115 CRS REPORT at 3 (noting that a “DAF can permit the contribution of a large indivisible 
appreciated property such as real estate. When the property is not divisible, the contribution can-
not be spread across many charitable donors or donated over time). 
 116 This strengthens the case that here, donor advised funds may be vehicles for giving that 
would otherwise not occur, but only to the extent that donors of complex assets do not reduce 
other contributions. 
 117 See supra note 83. 
 118 See supra note 103. 
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B. A Net-Benefit to Charity Approach to Noncash Assets 
Congress could respond in any number of ways. Least attractive is to 
do nothing. As outlined above, the system for property contributions is bro-
ken, notwithstanding some positive features of using DAFs in this con-
text.119 So, some response is warranted. 
To fashion a response, Congress should begin by taking note of first 
principles. In theory, as a matter of income measurement, no charitable de-
duction should be allowed for unrealized appreciation.120 The ability to de-
duct unrealized appreciation is no more and no less than a subsidy, the pre-
sumed intent of which is to encourage asset owners to transfer wealth to 
charity. To be sure, it is a longstanding and popular subsidy, but also one 
that is about to get more expensive with the rise of DAFs. DAFs thus pro-
vide an opening to question whether to keep the subsidy at all.121 
For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that policymakers want to 
continue to subsidize noncash charitable contributions.122 Nonetheless, with 
DAFs, tolerance for a deduction determined by an appraised value may fi-
nally be untenable. Sponsoring organizations operate complex donation 
programs primarily to liquidate donated property to cash. With a system 
emerging in the marketplace for intermediaries to accept and liquidate non-
cash property, there is a strong case that a deduction, if allowed, should be 
based on the net benefit to charity (i.e., the amount made available for dis-
tribution from the donor advised fund), not the appraised amount.  Thus, 
again assuming Congress intends to keep the subsidy, Congress should take 
the rise of the DAF giving vehicle as an opportunity to improve the system 
for noncash contributions (i.e., not just contributions to DAFs but to any 
charity) by reducing the costs of the subsidy and moving to a “net benefit to 
charity” approach to the deduction. 
A net benefit to charity approach for the deduction makes a lot of 
sense. It aligns the deduction with the amount that goes to the (active) chari-
                                                                                                                           
 119 As noted above, however, as sponsoring organizations become more deeply engaged in the 
business of selling assets, the more doubt is cast on exempt status. Unrelated business income tax 
issues are could arise. 
 120 William Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 
372. See also supra note 83. 
 121 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE 
AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 293-307 (Comm. Print 2005) (recommending elimination of 
the subsidy); Halperin, supra note 83 (arguing for a constructive realization of gain upon contribu-
tion). The author has argued elsewhere that the charitable deduction for property contributions 
should be viewed as a distinct tax expenditure with high tangible and intangible costs. Colinvaux, 
supra note 80. The article argues that if a charitable contribution for property is allowed, it should 
be only in cases where there is a measurable benefit to charity. 
 122 But see Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1 (introduced by Dave Camp) (ending the ability to 
deduct unrealized appreciation for real estate and privately held securities). 
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ty. As a result, donee organizations would have incentives to reduce transac-
tion costs in order to maximize donor deductions. Donors would be more 
likely to give noncash assets to donee organizations that have the most effi-
cient liquidation programs (meaning, in many cases, sponsoring organiza-
tions). If property does not sell for as much as donors hope or anticipate, the 
government (and so other taxpayers) will not be shortchanged by overpay-
ing for the contribution.123 Further, the net benefit to charity approach is not 
new, but is used in the context of vehicles124 and intellectual property.125 
A net benefit to charity approach would raise a number of issues. What 
is the deduction if the donee does not sell the property? Should there be a 
forced sale rule? Should the net benefit approach apply to all noncash as-
sets, or only those where valuation is a problem, or assets above a minimum 
value? Should there continue to be special rules for related use property? 
These are all important questions that, once there is agreement to move to a 
net benefit approach, would require answers. 
To see how a net benefit approach might work, one general rule (the 
“rule”) could be that the deduction for contributions of noncash assets to a 
public charity is equal to the lesser of: (1) the donor’s basis in the property 
plus one half of the appreciation (the “initial amount”); or (2) the net benefit 
to charity. The net benefit to charity would be determined based on: (1) in 
the case of a contribution to a sponsoring organization, the amount made 
available for distribution from the donor advised fund by donor advice; or 
(2) in the case of another public charity, the net sales proceeds. In the case 
of depreciated property, the initial amount would be the fair market value. 
The deduction could be allowed in the year of contribution, subject to re-
capture in the year the net benefit to charity can be determined, with a limit 
on recapture of a specified period from the contribution date. Although the 
initial amount of the subsidy (basis plus one-half the appreciation) may 
seem arbitrary, it is no less arbitrary in this context than fair market value, 
just not as generous. Further, the initial amount already is used as the allow-
able amount for certain contributions of inventory, and so has some prece-
dent.126 
The rule could be applied to any type of noncash asset, with appropri-
ate adjustments. Applying the rule to publicly traded securities, the amount 
of the deduction would be reduced from the exchange value (present law) to 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See e.g., National Philanthropic Trust, “Illiquid Asset Contribution Guidelines,” supra 
note 99 (cautioning donors that “[d]ue to the amount of time required to liquidate the asset, sales 
proceeds may differ from the appraised or fair market value at the time of the contribution”). 
 124 I.R.C. § 170(f)(12) (basing amount of deduction for vehicles on sales price). 
 125 I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), (m) (allowing an initial deduction of basis, to increase in later 
years based on income from the contribution to the donee). 
 126 I.R.C. § 170(e)(3). 
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the exchange value less one-half of the appreciation.127 Donors would still 
be able to deduct some of the appreciation in the property (i.e., the subsidy 
would not be eliminated), but not all. If the donee sold the securities for less 
than the initial amount, then the amount of the deduction would be reduced 
accordingly. If the contribution and sale occur in the same tax year of the 
donor, then no recapture would be required.128 For publicly traded securi-
ties, the limit on recapture could be one year after the contribution date, 
meaning that if the donee sold the securities more than one year later, there 
would be no recapture and the donor’s deduction would be the initial 
amount (basis plus one-half of the appreciation). 
Applying the rule to illiquid noncash assets like real estate and private-
ly held securities,129 the initial amount would be the donor’s basis plus one-
half of the appreciation based on the appraised value. In general, the recap-
ture period for illiquid assets should be longer than one year to account for 
the additional time it may take to dispose of the property. The net benefit to 
charity would be determined by reducing the sales proceeds by the costs 
associated with carrying and selling the property. Sponsoring organizations 
already make similar calculations in determining how much to charge each 
donor advised fund for the contribution.130 The principal difference then is a 
reduction in the amount of the deduction from full appraised value to the 
initial amount, not to exceed the net benefit to charity. 
Applying the rule to tangible personal property requires some addi-
tional consideration. As noted, the general rule is that, for appreciated prop-
erty, the deduction is the donor’s basis unless the property is for the related 
use of the donee. In general, contributions to a sponsoring organization will 
not be for a related use, so already the allowable amount is just the donor’s 
basis. The rule should not be applied to increase the deduction. 
Otherwise, the question is whether the subsidy should be reduced from 
appraised value to the initial amount for related use property. A full discus-
sion is outside the scope of this Article,131 but as an initial matter, related 
use property should not be treated differently from other property. For tan-
                                                                                                                           
 127 Some might argue that there is no reason to apply the rule to publicly traded assets, be-
cause valuation is not a problem. The reason to reduce the subsidy for the contribution of publicly 
traded assets is not to curtail abuse, but simply to reduce the cost of a generous subsidy. 
 128 As a practical matter, to avoid recapture and close the transaction, many donees would sell 
the property in the year of contribution. Nonsponsoring organization donees that prefer to retain 
the securities could do so, and the donor’s deduction would be fixed at the initial amount. 
 129 Some publicly traded securities could fall into this category if the securities were subject 
to substantial restrictions. 
 130 Non sponsoring organization public charities would have to track these amounts. 
 131 Related use property presents a slightly different challenge from other property. The main 
issue is that the subsidy here is, or should be, intended to deliver a specific type of property to 
charity (e.g., art to an art museum). The question then is the efficient level of the subsidy for the 
particular market. 
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gible personal property that is depreciated, the rule might apply only to 
items of property with a minimum value;132 otherwise a net benefit to chari-
ty calculation might not be feasible.133 
Over decades, Congress has wrestled with the correct deduction 
amount for charitable contributions of noncash assets, resulting in a multi-
tude of scenarios. Donor advised funds present Congress with an opportuni-
ty both to embrace the vehicle as an efficient mechanism for converting 
complex assets to cash for the benefit of charity, and also to improve the 
system of noncash contributions and reduce its many costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Donor advised funds attract a significant share of charitable giving and 
warrant Congress’s attention. The DAF is hard to conceptualize. The differ-
ent types of DAF sponsors and the different reasons donors give make it 
difficult to design a regulatory approach for all donor advised funds. Im-
portant considerations are that contributions to donor advised funds are sub-
stitutes for giving to other public charities and private foundations, but also 
represent new gifts. 
The national sponsoring organization emerges as distinct from other 
sponsors. The exempt purpose of the national sponsoring organization is to 
spend money for the benefit of other 501(c)(3) organizations, and is best 
characterized as a fundraising organization. Given the national sponsoring 
organization’s exempt purpose, the national sponsoring organization already 
is subject to a facts and circumstances based payout – the commensurate in 
scope test. Because national sponsoring organizations fundamentally are 
vehicles for spending not saving, Congress should apply legislatively the 
commensurate in scope test and require that national sponsoring organiza-
tions spend contributed funds over a specified time period. The goal of the 
payout is to provide a spending period long enough so as not to alienate 
new donors, but short enough so as not to extend unduly the delay to charity 
that results when DAFs are used as public charity substitutes.  
                                                                                                                           
 132 As noted supra, sponsoring organizations actively solicit tangible personal property like 
collectibles and artwork. See also NPT 2014 Report at 11 (noting that many sponsoring organiza-
tions “are willing to accept . . . real estate and tangible personal property. Typically, [they] liqui-
date them relatively quickly . . . .”). Sponsoring organizations also generally require a minimum 
value for complex assets. Thus, applying a net benefit to charity approach should not impose a 
significant new burden on sponsoring organizations, which already screen for appropriate contri-
butions and track costs. 
 133 Low value clothing and household items are an example. Donor advised funds appear to 
be used rarely for this type of property, however, leaving a more fulsome discussion for other 
occasions. TREASURY REPORT, at 61 (reporting a total of 142 donations in 2005 of clothing and 
household items, with a total value of $129,000, all at community foundations). 
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Congress also should recognize that DAFs increasingly are used for 
noncash charitable contributions. The positive effect will be to make prop-
erty conversions more efficient. The negative effect will be to accentuate an 
already broken system of property contributions at great expense: increas-
ing the cost of the subsidy, straining administration of the charitable deduc-
tion, and exacerbating equity concerns. Assuming that Congress intends to 
retain the subsidy for noncash contributions, Congress should use DAFs as 
an opportunity to reduce the cost of the subsidy of the entire system (not 
just DAF contributions) and move to a net benefit to charity approach to the 
deduction.
	  
 
